|
By Hidari, Section Events
According to the Washington Post: 'With the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the Bush administration is now depending on two politicians -- one accused in the 1990s of being a crook and the other still viewed as almost powerless -- to help prop up President Pervez Musharraf and stabilize volatile Pakistan, according to U.S. officials, regional experts and Pakistanis....Asif Ali Zardari, who has assumed the regency of his wife's Pakistan People's Party, is nicknamed "Mr. 10 Percent" for alleged corruption by profiting off government contracts when Bhutto was prime minister in the 1990s, charges for which he spent 11 years in prison. He will remain caretaker of Pakistan's largest opposition movement until their 19-year-old son finishes studies at Oxford and is ready to assume party control -- potentially many years away.
"He represents the old, entrenched faction of the PPP that resisted modernization of politics and sees parties as an extension of family politics, which is connected to the aura of corruption around him," said Isobel Coleman of the Council on Foreign Relations. Makhdoom Amin Fahim, who led the party during Bhutto's eight-year exile, is the party candidate to become prime minister if the PPP wins the largest vote in the Feb. 18 elections and forms a coalition government. First elected to parliament in 1970, he lacks both charisma and clout, according to U.S. officials and Pakistani experts.'
The key purpose of all this is as it has always been: to deny democracy to Pakistan.
There is a long history of this. As Tariq Ali has written:
'The roots of the problem go back to soon after the founding of Pakistan, when the military-bureaucratic leaders decided at an early stage (1950) to become a US satrapy: the Dulles brothers saw to it that the new ally was locked into a network of cold war alliances. Henceforth, US global priorities determined Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies. Whenever there was the threat of a democratic victory by parties pledging to withdraw Pakistan from US security arrangements, Foggy Bottom would appeal directly to the Pakistani army. The coups d'état of 1958 and 1977 were greenlighted by Washington, with disastrous results. Then there was the trial and execution -- privately approved by Washington -- of democratically elected Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir's father, by dictator Muhammad Zia ul-Haq; the creation of local state-backed jihadi groups to "liberate" Afghanistan from the Soviets; and the brutalization of the country's political culture with public floggings and hangings of criminals as well as activists. The ultimate consequences of the anti-Soviet jihad were America's turning a blind eye as General Zia hurriedly nuclearized the country, the attacks of 9/11 and the NATO occupation of Afghanistan, with the ensuing instability on Pakistan's northwest frontier. The post-cold war embargo designed to punish Pakistan for its possession of nuclear weapons proved ineffective, and all family tiffs were happily forgotten as the "war on terror" commenced. The balance sheet is dismal. The instability in the border provinces is a direct result of the NATO occupation and war in Afghanistan, which has created a crisis of conscience inside the army. There is much unhappiness at being paid to kill fellow Muslims in the tribal areas that border Afghanistan. The arrogant and humiliating behavior of NATO soldiers has hardly helped matters in either country, and sending US troops to train the Pakistani military in counterinsurgency can only further inflame passions. Long-term stability in Afghanistan requires a regional agreement involving India, Russia, Iran and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all NATO troops.' The real reason that the death of Bhutto has caused panic in Washington is that she was an essential part of the deal to shore up the Musharraf dictatorship, in order to keep Pakistan 'friendly' to the 'West' (a euphemism). This is essential to the 'Bush strategy' not just because 'we' need 'their' help to accomplish 'our' ends in Afghanistan, but also because of Pakistan's nuclear strategy. Scholars have long pointed out the hypocrisy of the US' toleration of Israel's nuclear arsenal and rightly so, but the US' tolerance (and worse) of Pakistan's is in some ways even worse, given that Pakistan is unstable in a way that Israel is not (yet). And this is why:'The man who devised the Bush administration's Iraq troop surge has urged the US to consider sending elite troops to Pakistan to seize its nuclear weapons if the country descends into chaos. In a series of scenarios drawn up for Pakistan, Frederick Kagan, a former West Point military historian, has called for the White House to consider various options for an unstable Pakistan. These include: sending elite British or US troops to secure nuclear weapons capable of being transported out of the country and take them to a secret storage depot in New Mexico or a "remote redoubt" inside Pakistan; sending US troops to Pakistan's north-western border to fight the Taliban and al-Qaida; and a US military occupation of the capital Islamabad, and the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan if asked for assistance by a fractured Pakistan military, so that the US could shore up President Pervez Musharraf and General Ashfaq Kayani, who became army chief this week.' Despite the fact that these decisions lead to more misery for the Pakistani people, this is not all bad news: the current turmoil in Pakistan means that an invasion of Iran is now quite definitely off the agenda. America will have all its work cut out for it defending its current colonies without expanding the Empire into Iran. For the moment. Although make no mistake, Iran's time will come. However, for the meantime, the world is a lot more dangerous, and the Bush strategy stands in ruins. People who think that Bush is now running out of time to further screw up the planet should bear in mind what he has done so far. There is always time enough for THAT.
Tags: (all tags) :: Add Tags to this Story
Propping up 'our' dictator. | 0 comments (0 topical, 0 hidden) | Post A Comment
|