Vladimir Putin's presidency (2000-08) responded to and refocused this sentiment in politically very skilful ways. He accompanied the re-establishment of political authority at the centre with the resourceful use of a Russian nationalism that long predated the Soviet period and indeed could be anchored as or even more legitimately in the centuries-long experience of imperial Russia...Putin also played on Russian fears of Nato expansion and of the countervailing image of a United States determined to develop a ballistic-missile defence system. Here, the cold-war precedent is relevant in explaining Russian antagonism to such a capability (even though this is missed by most western observers). The "balance of terror" during the cold war was believed to be stable as long as both sides possessed substantial but "only" adequate strategic nuclear forces. The ability of either side also to develop defences even as offensive forces were maintained would upset the balance. Indeed, that was why the Soviet Union agreed to the bilateral anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty in 1972 and why the George W Bush administration's withdrawal from the treaty in June 2002 had such a bad effect.....In the same week that Georgia has continued to cause much anxiety among western leaders, events in Afghanistan have provoked even more sleepless nights. The seriousness of the escalating conflict between the forces of Nato / Isaf and the Taliban was evident again in an intense engagement between French paratroops and Taliban paramilitaries on 19 August in which ten Frenchmen were killed. The lightning visit to the country of Nicolas Sarkozy in the aftermath reflects the extent of political concern in western capitals about the endemic violence as well as the French president's hyperactive style - for high-level worries over the course of the Afghan war as it nears its eighth year include how far western publics will continue to support their countries' involvement......It never rains, indeed: for if Georgia and Afghanistan were not enough, attentive policy-makers or advisers in the United States and Europe might have noticed three significant actions in recent days by Iran's government - all of which nominally concern civil rather than military programmes, yet all with implication for Tehran's tense relations with the United States in particular.

The first was on 17 August 2008, when Iran's news media reported the launch of a Safir-e Omid ("ambassador of peace") two-stage rocket with sufficient power to put a satellite into orbit. This may have been an attempt to actually launch a satellite, or it may have carried a dummy; in any case, the rocket veered off-course at the second stage. This, plus the fact that the firing had already been delayed by a couple of months, indicates that it may have been less than an unqualified success (see William J Broad, "Iran reports test of craft able to carry a satellite", International Herald Tribune, 18 August 2008). Washington responded by both calling the launch a failure and condemning it on the familiar grounds that an ostensibly civil programme could easily be diverted into an offensive missile with a substantial range.But whatever the precise circumstances and fallout, for Iran to get this far was a further demonstration of the country's technical capabilities.

The second action arrived a day later, when the Tehran authorities revealed a plan to develop a satellite-launch facility that would be made available to other Muslim countries. The third, also on 18 August, was an announcement by Iran's atomic organisation confirming that Iran was planning to build six more nuclear-power plants (in addition to the one that has long been under construction at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf). It is reported that contracts have been made with companies to begin site-surveys for the new sites, with the intention is to complete the reactors by 2021 (see "Iran plans to build six more nuclear plants", 20 August 2008).

The Bushehr reactor, which is being built with Russian help, has been much delayed; it is by no means certain that the additional reactors will be built; and the satellite rocket-test may well have been a failure. At the same time, these developments may matter less in the context of Iranian perceptions of their national status than that in general nuclear-power and space research are seen as strong indicators of modernity that light the way to better future for Iran. The offer of satellite-launch facilities for other Muslim countries reflects a similar impulse, reflecting the fact that Iran is intent on affirm a confident stance in the international arena. In pursuing its strategic course, Iran's leadership is drawing on a mix of available elements - including the sense of a long civilisational history, modern Iranian nationalism and the Islamist ideological solidarities of the 1979 revolution.

Iran's search for status is fuelled by its very large reserves of oil and (even more) of natural-gas, though an over-dependence here too entails a neglect of the serious economic problems facing the country. These include high inflation and unemployment (and under-employment), as well as the need for huge investment in oil-and-gas production if Iran's resources are to be used effectively to support the country's development.

The economic imperatives create reinforce internal political pressures on Iran's current leadership. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad faces an election in mid-2009 in which he will face a difficult challenge from rival candidates - including Mohammad Baqer-Ghalibaf, who aspires to replicate the same journey Ahmadinejad himself made from the mayoralty of Tehran to the presidency of Iran. The current project to upgrade Iran's technical prowess is a key part of the leadership's attempt to bolster its domestic popularity as well as its international standing - though whoever is elected in Iran will have the defence of perceived national interests as a primary concern.'

The salient point,  as Roger point  out,  is that,  after 1991, the American Empire stood unrivalled a the greatest imperial power the world had ever seen. Essentially no Empre in history had ever had as much power as the US  did between  1991 and 2001.